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INTRODUCTION
Assume that defendant Jones has been convicted of a criminal offense
or has pleaded guilty to the offense; the maximum punishment under
the applicable statute is twenty years imprisonment. The prosecution
argues that Jones should be subject to the possibility of an extra ten years
imprisonment based on a statutory provision that enhances the
maximum authorized punishment for an offender who has a prior
conviction. Jones contests that he has sustained the prior conviction
named by the prosecution - perhaps by claiming he is not the person
who was previously convicted or that the record of conviction is
inaccurate or inauthentic. Some state courts, based on state statutory or
constitutional guarantees, would grant Jones the right to a jury trial on
the existence of the prior conviction, with a requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.' With respect to the federal Constitution, however,
the prevailing view in the state and federal courts is that the Sixth
Amendment 2 does not guarantee a jury trial on the existence of the prior
conviction, nor do the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth3 or Fourteenth
Amendments 4 guarantee a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
on whether the defendant incurred the prior conviction.'
Alternatively, assume that defendant Sule has been convicted or has
pleaded guilty to the same offense. The prosecution asks that Sule be
subject to the same sentence enhancement, based on a prior juvenile
6
adjudication of delinquency, which the enhancement statute treats as a• . 7
conviction. Sule does not contest the existence of the prior delinquency
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...."). The Supreme Court has
applied the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to state courts, stating that "[b]ecause we
believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
' U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
6 In a juvenile court, the state may charge the juvenile with conduct that would be
criminal if committed by an adult. The juvenile found to have engaged in such conduct
typically is "adjudicated" rather than "found guilty" and is termed a "delinquent" rather
than a "criminal." See LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE
LAW 317 (2002); infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
' For example, in the Armed Career Criminal Act, Congress has specified that juvenile
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adjudication, but argues that because the juvenile tribunal did not afford
a right to a jury trial, the delinquency adjudication may not be the basis
of an enhancement beyond the statutory maximum for the subsequent
offense. Courts have split on whether the Constitution prohibits the use
of a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication in this way." A similar
challenge might be made by a defendant whose prior conviction was
produced by a different nonjury tribunal, such as a military court or an
ordinary court of law in which the defendant had no right to a jury trial
because the offense was deemed "petty."9 Moreover, a defendant who
was convicted in a tribunal in a foreign country might argue that the
foreign conviction may not be used to enhance a penalty beyond the
statutory maximum for a subsequent offense in the United States
because the foreign tribunal did not afford a jury trial or did not use the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for guilt.
10
Laws that enhance the statutory maximums for underlying offenses
based on prior convictions have long been common." In recent years,legislatures have enacted what have been called "two-strikes" or "three-
delinquency adjudications involving violent felonies qualify as "convictions" under the
statute for purposes of sentence enhancement. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (2002). See also
Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1187 nn.240-41 (2003) (detailing incidence of statutes and
sentencing guidelines that treat juvenile adjudications as equivalent to convictions for
sentencing enhancement purposes).
See infra notes 209-25 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has held that petty offenses do not fall within the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327-30 (1996)
(holding no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial of multiple petty offenses); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (interpreting right to jury trial as covering only serious
offenses, not petty ones); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (same);
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1904) (same).
,o Cf. United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir. 1998) (opining that prior
conviction in Philippines could be used to trigger mandatory minimum for U.S. crime even
though court in Philippines did not afford right to jury trial), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1079
(1999).
1 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 37-2739(a) (Michie 2002) (increasing available penalty for
second felony offender to twice allowable sentence for underlying offense); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-14(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (allowing sentence of twice maximum for
underlying offense if convicted defendant has one (1) prior felony sexual offense); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 901A.2(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2003) (requiring any person with prior sexually
predatory conviction to serve twice maximum sentence for underlying offense); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 529.1(A)(1)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (increasing available sentence for any
person with prior felony conviction to twice maximum for underlying offense); see also
Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National Assessment,
59-SEP. FED. PROBATION 16, 17 (1995) (stating that repeat offender laws date back to
sixteenth century England and colonial America).
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strikes" statutes, imposing long prison sentences, including life
imprisonment, following an offender's second or third felony
conviction." The Supreme Court repeatedly has approved such
recidivism statutes.13 In 2003, the Court rejected a defendant's argument
that his sentence under California's three-strikes statute violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
14
With the stakes so high, it is important to consider the process that
must attend the use of a prior conviction to enhance the statutory
maximum for a subsequent offense. In determining how prior
convictions may be used in this context, lower courts have focused
mainly on two Supreme Court decisions: Almendarez-Torres v. United
States15 and Apprendi v. New Jersey." In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that a prior conviction used to
enhance a statutory maximum should be treated as an "element" of the
offense, with the accompanying constitutional guarantees that the
prosecution must state the element in the indictment, prove the element
to a jury, and prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Although
the precise question before the Court was whether the government
12 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(b)(2) (1996) (mandating life imprisonment upon
second serious violent felony conviction); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(A) (1995) (Law. Co-
op. 1995) (mandating life imprisonment upon second felony conviction); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.92.090 (West 1992) (enacting first "three strikes" statute in United States); JOHN
CLARK ET AL., "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INsTrr. OF JUSTICE (Sept. 1997) (cataloguing that between 1993 and
1995, twenty-four states and federal government enacted "three strikes" laws); see also
Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect of Foreign Convictions Under American Repeat Offender
Statutes: A Case Against the Use of Foreign Crimes in Determining Habitual Criminal Status, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 503-04 & nn.3-9 (1997) (citing additional statutes).
3 See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) ("In repeatedly upholding
such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the
enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense ... [is] 'a stiffened penalty for the latest
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one."' (quoting
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding
that state's sentencing of three-time offender to life in prison with possibility of parole did
not violate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962)
("[Tihe constitutionality of the practice of inflicting severer criminal penalties upon
habitual offenders is no longer open to serious challenge."). But see Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 279 (1983) (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibited "a life sentence without
possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony").
" Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding against Eighth Amendment
challenge sentence of at least 25 years imprisonment for violation of California three-strikes
law, CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667, when sentence-triggering criminal conduct was theft of
three golf clubs priced at total of $1,197).
1" 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
16 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
See infra Part I.B.
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should have stated the prior conviction in the indictment, the majority
opinion contained broad language that the fact of a prior conviction is a
"traditional sentencing factor" rather than an element of the offense. 8
In Apprendi, the Court was concerned less with the possible distinction
between sentencing factors and elements of the offense, and more with
the effect that a fact would have on the maximum penalty facing the
defendant. Addressing the procedural guarantees that attach to a fact
that enhances a statutory maximum, the Court announced the general
rule that: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." 9 The Apprendi Court distinguished Almendarez-Torres as not
involving the burden of proof or the right to jury trial, and it cast doubt
on the continuing validity of Almendarez-Torres.
An extensive scholarly commentary has developed since the Apprendi
decision,' ° some critical of Apprendi, some critical of Almendarez-Torres,
and some critical of McMillan v. Pennsylvania,2' a pre-Apprendi decision
that permits judges to find by a preponderance of the evidence an
sentencing facts that bear on punishment within a statutory maximum.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed McMillan in a post-Apprendi
decision, Harris v. United States.2' I have previously criticized McMillan,
arguing that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to offense-
related facts that directly affect the possible sentence. 24 My purpose in
this article, however, is to use the core rationales of the Supreme Court
decisions as a basis for discerning whether the reasonable doubt
, See infra Part I.B.
19 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
20 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back
to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255 (2001); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle,
90 GEo. L.J. 387 (2002); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54
STAN. L. REV. 295 (2001); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1467 (2001) [hereinafter King & Klein, Essential Elements]; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due
Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2001).
21 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 80-81.
2 536 U.S. 545 (2002). Harris reaffirmed the rule announced in McMillan that
sentencing facts affecting a penalty within the statutory maximum need not be found by a
jury or be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
24 See Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723 (1993) [hereinafter Murphy, Integrating Constitutional
Authority]; Colleen P. Murphy, Jury Factfinding of Offense-Related Sentencing Facts, 5 FED.
SENT. RPT. 41 (1992).
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standard and the right to jury trial apply to the use of prior convictions
to enhance statutory maximums.
This article will examine two settings: first, the process for
determining whether the defendant incurred the prior conviction stated
by the prosecution; and second, the process that must have been
afforded by the tribunal that rendered the prior judgment. 5 With respect
to court determination of the existence of a prior conviction, I argue that
the Constitution guarantees proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a right
to jury trial. With respect to the process resulting in a prior judgment, I
suggest that due process requires that the prior tribunal have afforded
the reasonable doubt standard in order for the judgment to be eligible to
enhance the statutory maximum for a subsequent criminal offense. This• • 26
requirement would invalidate the use of foreign convictions in which
the tribunal employed a standard of proof that was not equivalent to the
reasonable doubt standard. The requirement would also invalidate the
use of civil judgments that were based on a lesser standard of proof.
27
On the issue of whether a jury trial must have been afforded in the
prior tribunal, I contend that when the conviction was produced by a
military tribunal or an ordinary court of law in a petty offense case, the
conviction may be used to enhance the statutory maximum for a
subsequent offense. Because the Supreme Court has deemed factfinding
by such nonjury tribunals reliable enough to impose punishment,2s such
factfinding should also be deemed sufficient to establish that the
' Cf. Brief for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Smalley v. United
States, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-6693):
The issue of whether a judge may impose an enhanced term of imprisonment,
based on the judge's finding at sentencing that the defendant was previously
convicted of a criminal offense, encompasses two subsidiary questions. The first
is whether the prior conviction may be accepted as a reliable adjudication of guilt
of a criminal offense, and used to increase the current sentence, without further
factual inquiry into the defendant's actual conduct that formed the basis for the
earlier conviction. The second is whether the judge rather than the jury at the
second proceeding may be authorized to find that the prior judgment was
actually entered against the defendant, even where the effect of that finding is to
impose a sentence greater than the statutory maximum that would otherwise be
available.
Id. at 9-10.
26 Throughout this article, I use the term "foreign convictions" to refer to convictions
rendered in a foreign country.
' For example, some courts have upheld the use of civil findings that resulted in a
driver's license forfeiture to enhance criminal penalties for subsequent DWI offenses. See
infra note 181.
2 See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
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defendant committed the prior offense for purposes of enhancing
punishment for a later offense. I suggest also that when a foreign
tribunal produced the conviction at issue, a jury trial need not have been
afforded, although the U.S. court that sentences for the subsequent
offense should determine whether the overall process in the foreign
tribunal was fundamentally fair. 29 By contrast, I argue that nonjury
adjudications of juvenile delinquency should not be eligible to enhance
the punishment for a subsequent adult offense, because therapeutic
treatment and rehabilitation, rather than gunishment, are the theoretical
goals of a separate juvenile justice system.
This article does not address the situation of a prior conviction that is
treated by the legislature to be an element of the offense, such as with a
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, because the constitutional
guarantees surrounding the proof of "elements" are well established.31
Nor does this article restate criticisms of the McMillan doctrine that
allows judges to find by a preponderance of the evidence facts (including
the fact of a prior conviction) that affect sentencing within the statutory
range for the underlying offense.32 Accepting McMillan, reaffirmed in
Harris, as the current law, I focus solely on the use of prior convictions
that enhance statutory maximums.
The article is organized as follows: Part I discusses the relevant
Supreme Court decisions and describes the jury trial and burden of proof
rules that have developed in those decisions. Part II examines the
constitutional guarantees for a defendant who wishes to contest the
existence of a prior conviction. It demonstrates that lower courts
typically have misread Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi on this matter,
and it argues that both the logic of Apprendi and considerations distinct
to the right to jury trial and the burden of proof indicate that the
Constitution guarantees jury determination, beyond a reasonable doubt,
of the existence of a prior conviction. Part III then turns to the process
that must have been afforded in the prior tribunal in order for a
judgment rendered by the prior tribunal to form the basis of a sentence
" See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
' See infra Part 1II.B.1.
31 When a prior conviction is an element of an offense, the defendant has a right to a
jury trial and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998) (citing Supreme Court decisions setting forth
constitutional requirements that attach to "elements" of crimes).
32 Accordingly, this article does not address the situation of a prior conviction placing
the defendant in a higher sentencing range under sentencing guidelines, but still within the
statutory maximum for the underlying offense.
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enhancement for a subsequent offense.
I. RELEVANT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In a system of indeterminate sentencing in the ordinary courts of law
- in which the judge has great discretion to select a sentence within a
broad statutory range - a relatively clear demarcation exists between
the judge's and jury's roles.33 With respect to "serious" criminal offenses,
the Constitution guarantees that the jury decides guilt or innocence at
trial;34 the judge may decide the sanction in a separate sentencing
proceeding.n A relatively clear demarcation also exists between trial and
sentencing as to the applicable standard of proof. At trial, due process
requires that guilt or innocence be proven "beyond a reasonable
doubt";36 at sentencing, courts traditionally have been able to find facts
without "constitutionally imposed burdens of proof."
37
Challenging these traditional demarcations are "mandatory
minimum" statutes, sentencing guidelines, and sentence enhancement
statutes that affect the possible punishment for an underlying offense.
Often under these statutes and guidelines, enumerated facts related to
the offense or the offender control the sentence. Constitutional questions
have therefore arisen as to whether such facts must be charged in the
I See, e.g., Feld, supra note 7, at 1116-19 (discussing judge's role in system of
indeterminate sentencing).
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies
only to "serious offenses," not to "petty offenses." See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 159 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1904) (stating that "there is no constitutional requirement of a
jury" for petty offenses). It has created a presumption that an offense is petty if the
maximum authorized term of incarceration is no greater than six months. The defendant
has the burden of showing that any additional statutory penalties are so severe that the
offense should be considered serious. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). For
further discussion of the Supreme Court's doctrine on the entitlement to criminal jury trial,
see Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial; 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 133 (1997).
1 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 251 (1949) (noting "wide
discretion" and "broad discretionary power" of sentencing judge); Feld, supra note 7, at
1116-19. In the sentencing history of the United States, legislatures, parole boards, and
judges have exercised varying control over specific sentences. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 3-49 (1973).
' See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
31 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 85, 92 n.8 (1986); see id. at 91 ("Sentencing courts
have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof
at all." (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949))).
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indictment (if in federal court), the standard of proof that applies to these
facts, and the extent to which jury determination of these facts is
guaranteed.
This part briefly discusses the major Supreme Court cases to address
these questions - McMillan, Almendarez-Torres, and Apprendi - with
particular focus on the Court's approach to the prior conviction topic.3 I
then cull from these decisions the rules that the Supreme Court thus far
has articulated pertaining to the burden of proof and the right to jury
trial.
A. McMillan v. Pennsylvania
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,9 the Supreme Court first distinguished
between elements of the offense and sentencing factors in deciding
whether a defendant has the right to a jury trial and the right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt on a fact that bears on punishment.40 The
Court upheld the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act,
which requires a minimum sentence for defendants convicted of one of
several offenses committed while in visible possession of a firearm.4' The
statute provides that after the defendant is found guilty of one of the
enumerated offenses, the judge determines, by a preponderance of the
evidence, whether the defendant visibly possessed a firearm.
42
The Supreme Court faced two questions in McMillan: first, whether
the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the state did not have to prove visible possession of
a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt; and second, whether the statute
deprived defendants of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on the
issue of visible possession. In responding to the due process challenge,
the Supreme Court distinguished elements of the offense from
sentencing factors and found that the state carries the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt only on elements of the offense. 4' The Court
emphasized that the state has substantial leeway in defining the
elements of a criminal offense and concluded that Pennsylvania had the
prerogative to consider visible possession of a firearm to be a sentencing
For more extended treatment of the cases, see articles cited supra notes 20 & 24.
477 U.S. 79 (1986).
o Id. at 85-93.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(a) (1982).
Id. § 9712(b).
3 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-91.
2004]
University of California, Davis
factor rather than an element of the offense. 44
While visible possession of a firearm in McMillan triggered a
mandatory minimum sentence, the Pennsylvania statute did not expose
defendants who visibly possessed a firearm to a greater statutory• 41
maximum for the underlying offense. In distinguishing some of its prior
due process doctrine, the Court noted that the Pennsylvania statute did
not "alter[] the maximum penalty for the crime committed."4" Moreover,
the McMillan Court commented that petitioners' argument that visible
possession was an element of the offense would have had "at least more
superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to
greater or additional punishment.
47
The Supreme Court gave cursory treatment to the Sixth Amendment
challenge, proclaiming that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact."
48
The McMillan Court stated that because visible possession of a firearm is
a sentencing factor, the jury right does not apply.
49
Two years after the Apprendi decision, in Harris v. United States,'° a five-
justice majority reaffirmed the McMillan rule that a judge may find by a
preponderance of the evidence sentencing factors that trigger a
mandatory minimum."' The case involved a fact related to the
commission of the underlying offense, and none of the opinions
52
commented directly on the question of prior convictions.
44 Id.
41 Id. at 88.
Id. at 87-88.
17 Id. at 88.
Id. at 93 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,459 (1984)).
" Id. In holding that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee jury determination of
offense-related facts, McMillan is a significant extension beyond Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447,
which upheld a state statute that permitted the judge in a capital case to override the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment and instead impose the death penalty. Spaziano did
not address whether the jury should decide offense-related facts that are part of the larger
question of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual.
- 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
1 In Harris, four members of the Court - Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia - agreed that McMillan and Harris on the one hand, and
Apprendi on the other, could be reconciled based on the distinction between imposing a
mandatory minimum and enhancing a statutory maximum. Id. at 549-68. Justice Breyer
did not agree that Apprendi could be distinguished from Harris "in terms of logic," but he
concurred in the judgment because he refused to accept the ruling in Apprendi. Id. at 569-72
(Breyer, J., concurring).
52 In an opinion for four dissenters, Justice Thomas reiterated a rule that he advocated
in Apprendi that when a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment than that otherwise
legally prescribed, that fact is an element of a separate legal offense. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J.,
[Vol. 37:973
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B. Almendarez-Torres v. United States
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 3 the Supreme Court addressed
precisely the type of situation it had mentioned abstractly twelve years
earlier in McMillan: one in which a fact found at sentencing exposed the
defendant "to greater or additional punishment. "' In Almendarez-Torres,
the existence of a prior conviction increased the statutory maximum for
the subsequent offense by eighteen years. A majority of five justices
held, however, that this did not mean that the Constitution requires that
the fact of a prior conviction be treated as an element of the offense that
must be charged in the indictment. As in McMillan, the Court drew a
sharp distinction between sentencing factors and elements of the offense
in terms of constitutional protections."'
The defendant was convicted of violating a federal statute that made it
illegal for a deported alien to return to the United States.56  The
maximum prison term for such a violation was two years. 7 If, however,
the initial deportation was subsequent to a conviction of an aggravated
58felony, the maximum prison term increased to twenty years. The
indictment charged the defendant with illegal reentry, but it did not
mention any prior convictions. 9 The defendant pleaded guilty to illegal
reentry and admitted that his earlier deportation had occurred pursuant
to three convictions for aggravated felonies.60  At sentencing, the
defendant argued that the prior convictions were elements of the "illegal
reentry" offense, and because the convictions had not been set forth in
the indictment, they could not be used to enhance his sentence. 61 The
district court rejected the argument and sentenced him to a prison term
62
of more than seven years.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas, found that Congress intended in the illegal reentry statute to
make the fact of prior convictions a sentencing factor rather than an
dissenting).
" 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
4 Id. at 245.
5 Id. at 239-47.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2003).
57 Id.
58 Id. § 1326(b)(2).
5 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
6' Id. at 227-28.
61 Id. at 227.
62 Id.
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element of the offense. 63 The majority then held that the Constitution did
not require that the fact be treated as an element, carrying with it the
requirement of notice in the indictment. 64 The majority relied heavily on
its characterization of recidivism as "a traditional, if not the most
traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's
sentence."''  Moreover, the majority commented that "the relevant
statutory provisions do not change a pre-existing definition of a well-
established crime" nor is there any indication that "Congress intended to
'evade' the Constitution, either by 'presuming' guilt or 'restructuring'
the elements of an offense."6
The Supreme Court distanced itself from its comment in McMillan that
there would be "more superficial appeal" to treating a fact as an element
of the offense if the fact exposed the defendant to greater punishment
than would otherwise be authorized by statute.67 The majority opined
that "the risk of unfairness to a particular defendant is no less, and may
well be greater, when a mandatory minimum sentence, rather than a
permissive maximum sentence, is at issue."68
Despite the broad language in Almendarez-Torres rejecting the
defendant's constitutional argument that the prior convictions be treated
as elements, the precise question before the Court was only whether the
convictions should have been charged in the indictment. Because the
defendant had admitted his prior convictions, the Almendarez-Torres
Court had no occasion to decide whether a defendant charged with
violation of the statute might have a right to a jury determination,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of whether he or she had a prior conviction
69
as defined by the statute.
Id. at 228-39.
Id. at 239-47.
6 Id. at 243.
' Id. at 246.
"' Id. at 245.
68 Id.
69 The majority noted that because Almendarez-Torres admitted his recidivism at the
time he pleaded guilty, "we express no view on whether some heightened standard of
proof might apply to sentencing determinations which bear significantly on the severity of
sentence." Id. at 248. The Court referenced United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 & n.2
(1997) (per curiam), which had "acknowledge[d] a divergence of opinion among the
Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically
increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 156.
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The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, and joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that the statute should be interpreted to
make recidivism an element of the offense, so as to avoid difficult
constitutional questions. 70  While purporting to refrain from passing
judgment on whether the Constitution requires that recidivism under
some circumstances be treated as an element of the offense, the dissent
attacked the majority's constitutional analysis. Among other things, the
dissent charged the majority with misreading McMillan by discounting
that "the determinative element in our validation of the Pennsylvania
statute [in McMillan] was the fact that it merely limited the sentencing
judge's discretion within the range of penalty already available, rather
than substantially increasing the available sentence." 71 Moreover, the
dissent asserted that "there is no rational basis for making recidivism an
exception" to a general rule that a fact that increases maximum
permissible punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.72  The dissent also cited "traditional practice" in which the
prosecution must prove recidivism to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.7 3
While Almendarez-Torres addressed whether the Constitution requires
a prior conviction, which would raise a statutory maximum, to be
included in a federal indictment, subsequent Supreme Court cases have
commented on whether the indictment must state other facts that would
raise the statutory maximum. The Court has indicated in Apprendi and
other decisions that if a fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction)
would raise the statutory maximum for a crime, it must be charged in the
indictment.74
70 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248-55, 260-71. The dissent cited the well-established
principle that "[Wihere a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." Id. at 250 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney
General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)).
" Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 259-60.
" See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) ("In federal prosecutions, such
facts must ... be charged in the indictment."); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476
(2000) ("[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to
a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
237, 243 n.6 (1999))).
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C. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,7 the Supreme Court considered whether a
fact that increases the maximum penalty for a state crime must be
determined by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant there pleaded guilty to several offenses, including a state
firearm offense punishable by up to ten years in prison. The trial judge
then held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant
had committed the firearm offense with a racially biased purpose; a
finding of such purpose would expose the defendant to an enhanced
sentence of up to twenty years imprisonment under the New Jersey hate
crime law. 76 The judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
presence of racial animus and sentenced the defendant to an enhanced
term of imprisonment.77
The Supreme Court majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, invalidated the
defendant's sentence, holding that the Constitution guaranteed the
defendant the right to have ajury determine whether racial bias existed
beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi stated that its holding was
"foreshadowed" by Jones v. United States7 9 a case decided the year before.
In Jones, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal carjacking statute as
creating three separate offenses rather than a single offense with three
possible maximum penalties. 80 The Jones Court explained that to
construe the statute otherwise would raise constitutional doubt about
whether a defendant subject to increased penalties under the statute
would be denied due process and jury trial rights.8 In a footnote, the
Jones Court commented that its prior cases "suggest" the principle that
"under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must
be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."
82
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
76 Id. at 470.
Id. at 470-71.
7 Id. at 491-97.
7 526 U.S. 227 (1999), cited in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-39.
8, Id. at 239-52.
82 Id. at 243 n.6 (1999), quoted in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
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Citing the above-quoted language from Jones, the Supreme Court in
Apprendi ruled that when state statutes are involved, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the same rights to a defendant, with the
exception of notice in the indictment. Using the prefatory language
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction," the Court stated that the
reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees apply to "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum. "84
The Court's conclusion in Apprendi turned largely on the notion that a
fact that would raise the maximum authorized punishment exposes the
defendant to an additional loss of liberty and a greater stigma than if the
defendant were found only to have committed the underlying offense;
thus, the procedural protections afforded the defendant on the
enhancement fact should be no less than those afforded on the elements
of the underlying offense.8 The majority wrote:
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute
when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma
attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that
the defendant should not - at the moment the State is put to proof
of those circumstances - be deprived of protections that have, until
that point, unquestionably attached. 6
Apprendi also recounted historical evidence that led the Court to
characterize as a "novelty" a legislative scheme "that removes the jury
from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal
defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone."
8 7
"3 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. The majority did not address the omission of an allegation
of racial basis in Apprendi's indictment because the Fourteenth Amendment has not been
held to incorporate against the states the Fifth Amendment right to a presentment or grand
jury indictment. Id. at 477 n.3.
Id. at 490. The Supreme Court extended the Apprendi rule to the capital context in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Without discussing the question of prior convictions,
Ring held that both capital and non-capital defendants "are entitled to a jury determination
of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."
Id. at 589.
'5 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
'7 Id. at 482-83. The Court noted the "historic link between verdict and judgment and
the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal
penalties provided." Id. at 482.
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In reaching its holding, the Apprendi Court minimized the significance
of a distinction between elements of the offense and sentencing factors.
The Court asserted: "Despite what appears to us the clear 'elemental'
nature of the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect - does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" Noting
that McMillan indicated that serious constitutional questions would be
raised if a judge could determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
fact that altered the maximum penalty for a crime, Apprendi asserted that
it was limiting the holding of McMillan to cases that did not involve the
possibility of a sentence greater than "the statutory maximum for the
offense established by the jury's verdict." 89 It described the distinction
drawn in McMillan between sentencing factors and elements of the
offense as "constitutionally novel and elusive," 9' but commented that the
term "sentencing factor" may appropriately label a fact that "supports a
specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the
defendant is guilty of a particular offense."9' This language implies
approval of the McMillan holding that a judge may find such facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. In sum, Apprendi indicates that, with the
possible exception of the fact of a prior conviction, when a fact would
raise the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, the legislature's
designation of the fact as a sentencing factor is irrelevant to determining
the federal constitutional guarantees that apply.
Having set forth its general rule on facts that raise a statutory
maximum, the Apprendi majority sought to distinguish Almendarez-
Torres.92 It noted that recidivism is not related to the commission of the
underlying offense, whereas racially biased purpose is. 93 Moreover, the
majority observed that because Almendarez-Torres had admitted his
prior convictions, no issues pertaining to the right to jury trial or the
standard of proof were before the Almendarez-Torres Court.
94
Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). The Court also commented that "when the term
'sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized
statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the
one covered by the jury's guilty verdict." Id. at 494 n.19.
Id. at 486-87 & 487 n.13.
Id. at 494.
9' Id. at 494 n.19.
92 Id. at 496, 488. The majority described Almendarez-Torres as "represent[ing] at best
an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described." Id. at 487.
'3 Id. at 495-96.
Id. at 488.
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Of particular significance to our topic is how Apprendi described the
process afforded Almendarez-Torres in the prosecution of his prior
convictions for aggravated felonies. Apprendi assumed a "certainty that
procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction" in
Almendarez-Torres.9 Apprendi commented that this "certainty," combined
with the fact that Almendarez-Torres had admitted the prior convictions,
"mitigated the due process concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a
judge to determine a 'fact' increasing punishment beyond the maximum
of the statutory range."96 The Apprendi majority did not specify in this
portion of the opinion the "procedural safeguards" to which it alluded.
Later in the opinion, however, the majority again distinguished
Almendarez-Torres, asserting that:
there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior
judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had
the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the
required fact under a lesser standard of proof.
97
This language suggests that an open question remains as to whether a
prior conviction obtained without affording these rights may properly be
used to enhance the statutory maximum for a subsequent offense.
Apprendi went beyond distinguishing Almendarez-Torres and directly
cast doubt on the continuing validity of the decision. While noting that it
"need not revisit" Almendarez-Torres because Apprendi did not involve
the question of enhancement based on recidivism, the Court commented
that "it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and
that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the
recidivist issue were contested." 98
" Id. at 488 (stating that prior convictions were "entered pursuant to proceedings with
substantial procedural safeguards of their own").
% Id.
97 Id. at 496 (emphasis added); see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999)
(commenting that "unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible
penalty for an offense... a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.").
"' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90; see also id. at 489 n.15 (referring to reasons set forth in
Justice Scalia's dissent in Almendarez-Torres and asserting that majority opinion in
Almendarez-Torres had "virtually ignored" the "pedigree of the pleading requirement" that
an "'indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the
punishment to be inflicted"') (citations omitted).
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The extended discussion in Apprendi qualifying Almendarez-Torres
suggests that the "other than the fact of a prior conviction" language in
Apprendi is read too broadly if interpreted to create an exception to the
general rule that any fact that increases the statutory maximum is subject
to the jury trial and reasonable doubt guarantees.99 Read in context, the
language seems merely to acknowledge that the issue of prior
convictions was not before the Apprendi Court."°°
Justice Thomas, who had joined the majority opinion in Almendarez-
Torres, wrote a concurring opinion in Apprendi in which he argued that
Almendarez-Torres and McMillan were wrongly decided.'' Relying
extensively on history, Justice Thomas advocated a broad rule that
would treat any fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing
punishment to be an element of the offense, with all the attendant
procedural consequences. 102 Justice Scalia joined in advocating such a
rule.1 3 Of Almendarez-Torres, Justice Thomas wrote: "one of the chief
errors [of the case] ... an error to which I succumbed, was to attempt to
discern whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) a basis for
a sentencing court to increase an offender's sentence."" 4 Rather than
focusing on "sentencing factors," Justice Thomas asserted, a court should
inquire into whether the fact (including the fact of a prior conviction) is a
Many lower courts have read the "other than the fact of a prior conviction" language
to have created an exception to the general rule in Apprendi. See infra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text.
" See Jones, 526 U.S. at 249 (referring to "possible constitutional distinctiveness"
between recidivism and other facts that increase statutory maximum in distinguishing
Almendarez-Torres from constitutional issues raised in Jones).
101 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518-22.
102 Id. at 499-519 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also cited a tradition of
treating recidivism as an element of the offense. Id. at 501-12, 521. Justice Scalia joined
Parts I and II of Justice Thomas's opinion, which discussed history and advocated a broad
rule that would treat any fact that by law imposed or enhanced punishment as an element,
but he did not join Part III, which directly suggested that McMillan and Almendarez-Torres
were wrongly decided. Id. at 499.
103 Id. at 499; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
believe that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant
receives - whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or
Mary Jane - must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."). Notwithstanding
Justice Scalia's assertions in Almendarez-Torres and Ring that facts essential to imposition of
the level of punishment should trigger the right to jury determination beyond a reasonable
doubt, he joined the plurality opinion in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556-68 (2002),
which reaffirmed the McMillan rule that a judge may find by a preponderance of the
evidence a fact that triggers a mandatory minimum.
o Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520.
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basis for imposing or increasing punishment."5
Applying Apprendi two years later in a death penalty case, Ring v.
Arizona,'°6 the Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the Arizona death
penalty scheme. Arizona law provided that after a defendant was
found guilty of first-degree murder, the trial judge, rather than the jury,
would determine whether statutory aggravating factors existed that
would enable imposition of the death penalty.0' The Court held that this
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment, citing Apprendi for the rule that
defendants "are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the
legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. " 109
Nothing in either Apprendi or Ring specifies when jury determination
beyond a reasonable doubt of a fact that would raise the statutory
maximum must occur. That is, the cases do not require that the
enhancement fact be tried at the same time as the underlying offense.
Thus, it would seem that legislatures or courts may provide either that
the enhancement fact be tried at the same time as the underlying offense
or that the enhancement fact be determined afterwards.1 Indeed,
legislatures, particularly in the death penalty context, have commonly
separated the trial of the underlying offense from consideration of facts
that would raise the possible punishment."'
The Court has granted certiorari in a case raising additional Apprendi
issues. Blakely v. Washington12 involves a state sentencing scheme that
requires the existence of aggravating factors to depart upward from
statutorily imposed sentencing guidelines. 3 State law permits these
10. Id. at 522-23.
536 U.S. 584.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 588.
108 Id. at 589.
110 But see Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1814 n.175
(2003) ("Apprendi is properly understood as forbidding certain determinations from being
left to sentencing, rather than as requiring a jury at sentencing."); id. at 1834 n.298 ("The
Court's conclusion [in Apprendi] was not, however, that the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt applies at sentencing - raising the burden of proof would not have
saved the statute - but rather that the fact in question was an element of the offense that
had to be proven at trial.").
"' In death penalty cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
require that the class of death-eligible persons be narrowed in a predictable manner. See,
e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232-34 (1992) (citing cases). This narrowing function
may be performed "at either the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase." Id. (citing
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988)).
112 Blakely v. Wash., 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. 2002), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3280 U.S. Oct.
20, 2003) (No. 02-1632).
13 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(1), (2) (2000); State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 276 (Wash.
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aggravating factors to be found by a judge under a preponderance of the
evidence standard,14 and the defendant is arguing that this scheme
violates the principles of Apprendi.
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, it seems safe to say that any
fact (with the possible exception of the fact of a prior conviction) that
raises a statutory maximum must be found by a jury, with proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Moreover, any fact that triggers a mandatory
minimum may be found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence
as long as the statutory maximum for the offense remains the same.
Within these rules and the rationales that produced them, the remainder
of this article will address the procedural requirements for using prior
convictions to raise the statutory maximum for a subsequent offense.
II. DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, it is important to
consider whether a defendant is entitled under the federal Constitution
to a jury trial and the reasonable doubt standard in contesting the
existence of a prior conviction. A defendant might contest the
existence of a prior conviction by arguing that the defendant is not the
person who was previously convicted or that the records of the prior
conviction are inauthentic or inaccurate. Although genuine dispute
about whether the defendant incurred the prior conviction claimed by
the prosecution may be relatively infrequent in the domestic context, the
existence of a prior conviction produced by a foreign tribunal may be
subject to significant factual uncertainty.116 For example, aliases might be
2001).
114 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.370(2) (2000).
"' Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) (providing that after
convicting defendant, jury determines if state has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
defendant had accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 278, § 11A (West 1998) (stating that defendant "shall be entitled to a trial by jury
of the issue of conviction of a prior offense, subject to all of the provisions of law governing
criminal trials"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.5 (2001) (providing that once defendant is found
guilty of principal felony, issue of recidivism shall be presented to same jury); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-12 (Michie 1998) ("The defendant shall... be informed of his right to
a trial by jury on the issue of whether he is the same person as alleged in the habitual
criminal information."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-19 (Michie 2000) (providing for jury
determination of identity with respect to records of conviction and sentence).
116 In many cases, the fact of a prior conviction will be not be in dispute, presumably
because it is a matter of public record and identity is not at issue. See, e.g., Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998) (referring to fact of prior conviction as "almost never
contested"). Justice Scalia in Almendarez-Torres, however, disagreed with the majority's
assertion that the facts of prior convictions are "almost never contested," citing
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involved or the foreign criminal justice system may not have used
methods that would confirm identity, such as fingerprinting or DNA
matching. 7
In this part, I argue that the logic of Apprendi extends to the proof of
prior convictions; that is, a defendant has the right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial on the existence of a prior
conviction when a prior conviction would raise the statutory maximum
for a subsequent offense. I also discuss the reasonable doubt standard
and the right to jury trial separately, for the two guarantees have distinct
rationales that would support their application to proof of a prior
conviction.
A. Applying the Logic of Apprendi
At least one federal appellate court before Almendarez-Torres
determined that when a prior conviction would raise the statutory
maximum for a subsequent offense, the defendant has a federal
constitutional right to a jury determination of whether the defendant is
the same person who incurred the prior conviction."5 After Almendarez-
Torres and Apprendi, one federal appellate court, without mentioning
those cases, wrote in passing of the government's "burden to prove [the
defendant's] prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt" for sentencing
enhancement purposes.19 Other courts after Almendarez-Torres and
Apprendi, however, have held that the Constitution does not guarantee
that a jury determine whether the defendant was previously convicted or
that the prior conviction be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 These
prosecutions of unlawful entry into the United States as contexts when prior foreign
convictions often might be contested. Id. at 268-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
.. See, e.g., id. (Scalia J, dissenting) (discussing problem of identifying illegal alien
felons who may have used aliases).
"' Carroll v. Boles, 347 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir. 1965).
119 United States v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034, 1038 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 926
(2002) (involving sentencing enhancement under 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2002)).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 948 (2002) (holding that prior conviction used to enhance sentence need not be
proven beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1107 (2002) (concluding it was proper that judge find according to
preponderance of evidence that defendant had prior convictions); People v. Epps, 18 P.3d
2, 3 (Cal. 2001) (stating that "[tihe right, if any, to a jury trial of prior conviction allegations
derives from [state law] not from the state or federal Constitution" and citing Apprendi);
People v. Garcia, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that defendant had no
constitutional right to jury determination of whether defendant had been previously
convicted); People v. Belmares, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that
defendant "had no constitutional right to a jury trial on his identity as the person" named
20041
University of California, Davis
lower court opinions often contain fleeting recitations of the "other than
the fact of a prior conviction" language in Apprendi.12' As suggested
earlier, the surrounding discussion in Apprendi indicates that this
language did not necessarily carve out an exception to the general rule
on facts that raise a statutory maximum. 122 Moreover, the lower court
cases commonly assert that requiring jury trial or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt would contradict Almendarez-Torres. The lower courts
either infer that Almendarez-Torres covered the burden of proof and jury
trial issues,123 or they specifically (and mistakenly) characterize
Almendarez-Torres as having held that a prior conviction need not be
determined by a jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 124
Contrary to the assumptions of these lower courts, neither Almendarez-
Torres nor Apprendi answered whether the Constitution requires a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the existence of a prior
conviction. Recall that Almendarez-Torres involved a defendant who
pleaded guilty to the underlying offense and who admitted his prior
convictions. Thus, the case did not address the situation presented in
these lower court decisions of a defendant contesting the existence of a
prior conviction. Almendarez-Torres did not have occasion to address the
burden of proof and the right to jury trial - the Court had before it only
whether the prior convictions should have been charged in the
indictment.
in packet of certified prison records); People v. Smith, 788 N.E.2d 1204 (Il1. App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that defendant did not have right to trial by jury on existence of prior conviction);
State v. Wheeler, 34 P.3d 799 (Wash. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 996 (2002) (concluding that
state was not required to prove defendant's recidivism to jury beyond reasonable doubt).
121 See, e.g., Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1088; Davis, 260 F.3d at 969; Belmares, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 406; Smith, 788 N.E.2d at 1207; Wheeler, 34 P.3d at 802.
12 See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
12" See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 966 (2001) ("Almendarez-Torres is dispositive here. The district court was
entitled to consider any prior aggravated felony convictions ... even though such conduct
had not been charged in the indictment, presented to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."); United States v. Salery, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 2000)
(rejecting defendant's argument that prior felony drug convictions should have been
submitted to jury because "the court is bound by Supreme Court precedent.").
121 See, e.g., United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 976 (2002) (characterizing Almendarez-Torres as holding "that prior
convictions need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt"); United States v. Brough, 243
F.3d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 889 (2001) (stating that Apprendi did
"not overrule the holding of [Almendarez-Torres] that penalty enhancements based on
recidivism need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt").
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Jones and Apprendi both read Almendarez-Torres as confined to the
question of indictment.' 2' In Jones, the Supreme Court stated that
Almendarez-Torres was "not dispositive" of the constitutional questions
discussed in Jones, in part because "we are concerned with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial and not alone the rights to indictment and
notice as claimed by Almendarez-Torres. 1 26 Apprendi stated that "no
question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof that
would apply to a contested issue of fact was before the Court" in
127Almendarez-Torres. Thus, it is incorrect for courts to assume that
Almendarez-Torres, Jones, or Apprendi directly address whether a
defendant contesting the existence of a prior conviction is entitled to a
jury determination or to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although it has not confronted whether the jury right and the
reasonable doubt standard apply to the fact of a prior conviction that
would raise a statutory maximum, the Supreme Court has specified
some procedural rights that the Constitution guarantees a defendant
with respect to allegations of recidivism. The Court has indicated that
the Due Process Clauses guarantee notice and an opportunity to be
heard on whether the defendant sustained a prior conviction. It has
also held that a defendant has the right to counsel on an habitual
criminal charge.9 Elaborating on these guarantees, the Court has stated:
"Due process, in other words, requires that [the defendant] be present
with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with
witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer
12 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000) (noting that "the specific
question decided in [Almendarez-Torres] concerned the sufficiency of indictment."); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999) (stating that "the precise holding" of Almendarez-
Torres was that "recidivism increasing the maximum penalty" need not be charged in the
indictment). But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 269 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing import of majority decision as "taking [the factual issue of a prior
conviction] away from the jury in all cases").
126 Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49; see also id. at 249 (stating that "Almendarez-Torres cannot...
be read to resolve the due process and Sixth Amendment questions" that would be raised if
federal carijacking statute were not interpreted to provide for three separate offenses).
127 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488.
2 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962) (holding that due process did not require that
notice of recidivism charge be given prior to trial on substantive offense when recidivism
charge would be tried separately, but stating that "[nievertheless, a defendant must receive
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to the recidivist charge."); cf.
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (citing Supreme Court cases indicating that
defendant must receive reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard on recidivism issue).
12 See Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S.
525 (1961); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
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evidence of his own."' 30 Let us now consider whether the reasonable
doubt standard and the right to jury trial also apply.
Focusing on the rationale for the Apprendi holding suggests that there
is much to support the principle that any fact (including the fact of a prior
conviction) that enhances a sentence beyond a statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3 1  In
Apprendi, it was the additional loss of liberty and greater stigma
presented by an increase beyond the statutory maximum that triggered
the rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a jury
determination of the disputed fact.' 32 A prior conviction that permits a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense
threatens the same consequences. 133 Thus, the concerns about liberty and
stigma offered to justify the Apprendi holding apply whether the
contested fact involves conduct related to the underlying offense or
involves whether the defendant sustained a prior conviction.
In addition, Apprendi emphasized that "at the moment that the State is
put to proof of those circumstances" that would expose the defendant to
a greater loss of liberty and heightened stigma, the defendant should not
"be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably
attached." 134 This concern about denying the defendant a right to jury
determination of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt at a time when
additional punishment is threatened seems to apply equally when the
"circumstance" is that of a prior conviction. Based on the logic of
Apprendi, the defendant should be afforded the right to a jury trial on the
existence of a prior conviction, and that prior conviction should be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' The majority in Apprendi perhaps
13 Specht, 386 U.S. at 610.
131 Cf. King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra note 20, at 1479-80 (commenting that one
way to reconcile Apprendi with Almendarez-Torres is for Supreme Court to "conclude that
when a prior conviction triggers a higher maximum sentence, an accused has the right to
insist that the government prove the prior offense beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, but
no right to insist that the prior offense be alleged in the original indictment. In other
words, the Court could interpret the Constitution to require the government to treat
recidivism as an element for some purposes (jury and burden of proof) but not others
(indictment).").
132 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
1 A defendant faces an additional loss of liberty when a prior conviction would
trigger enhanced punishment for the subsequent offense. Moreover, the stigma attaching
to the subsequent offense is heightened. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400
(1985) (characterizing subsequent offense as "'an aggravated offense because a repetitive
one"' (citation omitted)).
"3 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,484 (2000).
" If the existence of a prior conviction must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond
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hinted at such when it stated that "it is arguable ... that a logical
application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue
were contested. " 13
Of course, the reasoning in Apprendi arose in the context of a disputed
fact that was related to the underlying offense. The question thus is
whether the fact of a prior conviction is so different from an offense-
related fact that the logic of Apprendi should not apply. The majority in
Almendarez-Torres suggested that recidivism historically has been treated
differently in terms of procedures, but the dissent in Almendarez-Torres
and Justice Thomas's opinion in Apprendi contested that assertion.
3 7
One might argue that an offense-related fact and the fact of a prior
conviction differ substantially because of the amount of process that has
already attached to each fact. With respect to a prior conviction, the
defendant was afforded substantial process in the case that produced the
conviction - in a U.S. tribunal, the government would have had the
duty to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant
may also have had a right to jury trial. With respect to a fact that is
related to the offense for which the defendant is now being prosecuted,
a reasonable doubt, a further question might arise. Must the jury determine whether the
prior conviction "counts" under the governing statute? Consider the federal Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), which enhances penalties based on three prior convictions for a
"violent felony" or a "serious drug offense" that were "committed on occasions different
from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2003). After Apprendi, some
defendants have challenged their sentences under the Act because a jury did not determine
whether the prior convictions involved a "violent" felony or whether the prior convictions
were for offenses committed on different occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson,
313 F.3d 121, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2002) (not reaching question whether judge or jury should
determine whether defendant's juvenile adjudication was violent felony for purposes of
ACCA); United States v. Morris, 293 F.3d 1010, 1011-13 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
987 (2002) (relying on Almendarez-Torres in rejecting defendant's argument that sentence
enhancement violated Apprendi because jury was never presented with issue of whether
convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another" under ACCA).
The courts consistently have treated as questions of law whether a felony was
violent or whether certain offenses were committed on different occasions. See, e.g., Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (stating that in determining whether prior felony
is violent under section 924(e)(B)(ii), sentencing court should "look only to the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense"); United States v. Wilkerson,
286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 892 (2002) (characterizing trial
judge's determination of whether felony was "violent" as question of law to be reviewed
de novo); United States v. Phillips, 149 F.3d. 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1052 (1999) (characterizing trial judge's determination of whether offenses were committed
on different occasions as question of law to be determined de novo). If appropriately
characterized as questions of law, these questions would not implicate the burden of proof
or the jury's constitutional province.
1" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489.
137 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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however, the defendant has not yet received this kind of process. One
might read the "other than the fact of a prior conviction" language in
Apprendi as implicitly recognizing this difference. The offense-related
fact that increases a statutory maximum must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the defendant has the right to a jury
determination of that fact; in contrast, the prior conviction that increases
a statutory maximum may be determined by a judge by a preponderance
of the evidence because the defendant already received substantial
process resulting in the prior conviction. Such a reading of Apprendi,
however, does not contradict the proposition advocated here - that the
reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees should apply to the factual
question of whether the defendant incurred the prior conviction alleged by
the prosecution. This factual question does not contemplate
reconsideration of whether the defendant should have been previously
convicted.
In both historical and contemporary practice, many recidivist statutes
that enhance statutory maximums have treated the fact of a prior
conviction as equivalent to an offense-related fact in terms of the
procedures afforded; these statutes lend support to the notion that an
offense-related fact and the fact of a prior conviction are similar enough
in their inpact on the defendant to warrant the same procedural
guarantees. Moreover, when possible enhancement of a statutory
maximum is not involved - for example, when the defendant faces a
mandatory minimum within the statutory range for the underlying
offense - factfinding by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence is
constitutionally adequate under McMillan and Harris for both prior
convictions and facts related to the offense.139 Thus, it is not obvious that
proof of a prior conviction is so different from proof of an offense-related
fact that the rationale of Apprendi should be inapplicable.
As described earlier, Apprendi cast doubt on the continuing validity of
the Almendarez-Torres holding that a prior conviction need not be alleged
in the indictment in order for the prior conviction to serve as a sentence
enhancement.1  Even assuming that Almendarez-Torres survives
Apprendi, its holding is reconcilable with the suggestion here that a
defendant is entitled to contest the existence of a prior conviction before
' See supra note 115.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged "a divergence of opinion among the Circuits
as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase
the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence," but it has not resolved the
issue. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997).
" See supra note 98.
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a jury that must find proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
arguably does not need notice in the indictment of the fact of a prior• .• 141
conviction. If the defendant has indeed sustained a prior conviction,
defense counsel should make the defendant aware of the possibility of
enhancement of penalties under the governing law. Moreover, at some
point, as the Supreme Court has held, due process requires that the
prosecution give the defendant "reasonable notice" of its intention to
seek a penalty enhancement based on a prior conviction. 14Due process
also guarantees that the defendant must have an opportunity to be heard
on the existence of the prior conviction.143  For the defendant who
contends that he or she is not the person previously convicted, or who
otherwise wishes to contest the fact of the prior conviction, this
"opportunity to be heard" could include the right to jury determination
of the contested fact and the right to have the fact proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The factfinding could occur after conviction or after a
plea of guilty.'4
Although Apprendi linked the reasonable doubt and jury trial
guarantees, in many circumstances, the two are not coextensive. The
right to criminal jury trial may exist with respect to a fact that need only
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (such as with a
defendant's burden of proof on the affirmative defense of insanity). 45
Conversely, the reasonable doubt standard may apply even though no
141 Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Smalley v. United States,
294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-6693) ("Principles of notice and fundamental fairness
do not require that prior convictions be alleged in the indictment or found by a jury in
order for the defendant to be sentenced to a longer term as a recidivist. A defendant
cannot claim surprise concerning the fact of a prior conviction, because he previously
underwent the criminal process that led to the judgment.").
11 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
143 See id.
1" It is common for the fact of a prior conviction to be determined by a jury after a
finding of guilt on the subsequent offense. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 1998
& Supp. 2002) (providing that after convicting defendant, jury determines if state has
proved beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had accumulated two prior unrelated
felony convictions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.5 (2001) (providing that once defendant is found
guilty of principal felony, issue of recidivism shall be presented to same jury); Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567 (1967) (describing English rule, under which indictment alleges
both substantive offense and prior conviction, but jury is not charged on prior conviction
until after it convicts defendant of substantive offense); see also Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 268-69 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I doubt whether 'infection'
of the jury with knowledge of the prior crime is a serious problem.... If it is a problem,
however, there are legislative and even judicial means for dealing with it .... ").
" See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977) ("[O]nce the facts constituting a
crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt ... the State may refuse to sustain the
affirmative defense of insanity unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.").
2004]
University of California, Davis
right to jury trial exists (such as in a juvenile court proceeding, the trial of
a petty offense in an ordinary court of law, or the trial of a criminal
offense in a military court). Thus, in the next two sections, I discuss
considerations that are distinct to the burden of proof and the right to
jury trial.
B. Considerations Distinct to the Burden of Proof
With respect to the burden of proof that should apply to the existence
of a prior conviction, it is instructive to consider some of the Supreme
Court's statements on due process and the reasonable doubt standard.
The Court has stated that "the [reasonable doubt] standard symbolizes
the significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and
thus to liberty itself."' 46 The Court has written of the "transcending
value" that a criminal defendant has in his liberty and has asserted that
the "margin of error is reduced" by using proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 147  Further, the Court has commented that: "[Use] of the
reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in application of the criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned." 14
The McMillan Court, in finding that a sentencing factor triggering a
mandatory minimum could be determined by a preponderance of the
evidence, distinguished this line of authority. McMillan noted that
sentencing takes place only after the defendant has been found guilty
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
"' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value - as a criminal defendant his liberty - this margin of error
is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of ...
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) ("In a criminal case... the
interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit
constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to
exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the
administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon
itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove
the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.").
I" Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting
that function of standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication").
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beyond a reasonable doubt.149 Upon a conviction, the defendant "has
been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State
may confine him."5 ' This reasoning in McMillan is inapplicable,
however, when a fact would enhance the defendant's possible
punishment beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.
In such a circumstance, a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of
the underlying offense would not alone authorize the deprivation of
liberty sought by the prosecution.
Based on the Supreme Court's many statements about the
constitutional need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because of what
is at stake for the defendant and for society, the existence of a prior
conviction that would raise a statutory maximum should be found
beyond a reasonable doubt. This proposition can be reconciled with
McMillan and Harris. In those cases, the defendant was not exposed to
the possibility of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum. When a
factfinder finds the defendant guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defendant becomes exposed to a loss of liberty up to the
statutory maximum. A lesser standard of proof arguably is adequate to
protect the interests of the defendant and of society in proper sentencing
within the statutory limit. But when the defendant is subject to
additional punishment, society should not be "in doubt" as to whether
the defendant indeed sustained a prior conviction. Nor should the
defendant be subject to the significant "margin of error" inherent in the
preponderance of the evidence standard.
In most cases, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of a prior conviction should not be more onerous than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. The facts often will be clear from the
paper record and, if necessary, from scientific means of identifying the
defendant as the same person who incurred the prior conviction (such as
fingerprinting or DNA matching). In this respect, proof of a prior
conviction differs from proof of enhancement facts that depend on
testimony. The reasonable doubt standard applied to the fact of a prior
conviction would reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty
without unduly burdening the prosecution.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 85, 86 (1986).
Id. at 92 n.8 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,224 (1976)); see also id. at 83.
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C. Considerations Distinct to the Right to Jury Trial
Even if one were to assume that the reasonable doubt standard need
not apply to proof of the existence of a prior conviction, considerations
beyond the liberty and stigma rationale of Apprendi support the right to
have a jury determine whether the defendant incurred a prior conviction
that would raise the statutory maximum for a subsequent offense.
Apparent in the language of Apprendi itself is an isolated focus on the
jury right. Recall that the Court remarked on "the novelty" of removing
from the jury the determination of a fact that would expose the
defendant to a penalty higher than that which would have been possible
based on the verdict alone."' The backdrop to that comment was the
Court's assertion that history demonstrated a strong link between jury
verdict and judgment."'
Another consideration pertains to the core questions that juries
historically have entertained - what happened and who did it? The
question of whether the defendant is the "person who did it" is a core
question often present in both civil and criminal cases. For example, in
a tort suit for damages, the litigants have a constitutional right to have a
jury determine whether the defendant is indeed the person who
committed the tort.154  The standard of proof, of course, is a
preponderance of the evidence. It seems anomalous that the core
question of whether the defendant is the "person who did it" - i.e., the
person who incurred the prior conviction - would be beyond the scope
of the jury trial right in the criminal context simply because a prior
conviction is labeled a traditional sentencing factor. The concerns
about government oppression that motivated the Framers to enshrine a
right to criminal jury trial are as present when the question is whether
1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000); see supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
152 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478-84.
153 See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 266, 268 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Court's assertion that fact of prior conviction is "almost never
contested" is erroneous, particularly in unlawful-entry cases where issues of identity are
common).
"51 In a suit seeking purely equitable relief, typically an injunction, the Seventh
Amendment does not guarantee a right to jury trial. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (noting that only "legal" actions are jury triable of right under Seventh
Amendment).
"' Perhaps because the question of "who did it" is one that seems to be at the core of
the jury's functions, many states have juries, not judges, determine whether the defendant
incurred a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing enhancement. See supra note 115
and accompanying text.
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the defendant suffered a prior conviction as when the question is
whether the defendant committed the offense for which he or she has
been charged.1 6 The question of proper identity would seem to be at the
core of the jury's functions of factfinding and protecting against
governmental overreaching.
This line of reasoning seemingly would apply with equal force
whether the existence of the prior conviction would raise a statutory
maximum or would trigger a mandatory minimum within a statutory
range."' Accordingly, perhaps one of the rules of McMillan and Harris -
that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee jury determination of facts
bearing on sentence when those facts would trigger a mandatory
minimum but not raise the statutory maximum for an offense - should
be modified so as to exclude the fact of a prior conviction. However, one
might argue that when a defendant's sentence for a subsequent offense
may be enhanced within a statutory range based on a prior conviction,
the jury's functions of factfinding and protecting against governmental
overreaching will have already been afforded the defendant. Whether
the defendant pleaded guilty or opted for a jury trial and was convicted,
the judgment will have exposed the defendant to a potential sentence at
the statutory maximum for the offense. Nevertheless, the argument
remains that the jury right should extend to determining the existence of
a prior conviction when that fact would raise a statutory maximum.
Granting a right to jury trial on the existence of a prior conviction
arguably will produce inefficiency in the system and the possibility of
nullification." 9  With documentary evidence (records of conviction,
fingerprints, etc.), genuine factual disputes about the existence of a prior
conviction will be more the exception than the rule. Nonetheless, several
states with recidivist statutes grant the right to jury trial on the existence
15 Cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 461 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The charge of
being an habitual offender is as effectively refuted by proof that there was no prior
conviction ... as by proof that the accused is not the person charged with the new
offense.").
15 As noted earlier, several states confer statutory rights to jury determination of the
existence of a prior conviction, even when the prior conviction would enhance the sentence
within the statutory maximum. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
" Formal sentencing guidelines, however, may alter the notion that a verdict or plea of
guilty exposes the defendant to punishment at the statutory maximum for the offense.
" See, e.g., People v. Epps, 18 P.3d 2, 4 (Cal. 2001) (referencing statute that withdrew
from jury question of whether defendant was person who had incurred prior conviction
and describing supporters of statute as asserting that "evidence on [identity] was generally
conclusive, and the trial court could expeditiously try the issue without a jury" and that
"jury trials of [the existence of a prior conviction] were burdensome and expensive for the
court system, as well as aggravating for jurors.").
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of a prior conviction.'6 These states thus have made the judgment that
the possibility of inefficiency or nullification is outweighed by the
benefits of jury trial. California presents a counterexample. Three years
after California passed its "three-strikes" law, the legislature revised a
preexisting statute that granted a right to jury trial on the existence of a
prior conviction. Under the revised statute, the judge, not the jury,
generally is to decide the question of identity - i.e., whether the
defendant is the person who suffered the prior conviction."' Any other
issues pertaining to whether the defendant sustained a prior conviction
(such as the authenticity or accuracy of conviction records) are left for
the jury. The legislative history of the amendment expressly indicated
that saving court time was the reason for permitting the judge to decide
the question of identity. 163
Concerns about the possible inefficiency of jury trial on the existence
of a prior conviction may be mitigated by the reality that many
defendants will waive their jury right as part of a deal with the
prosecution or so as not to predispose the sentencing judge
unfavorably.1 6 Moreover, trials that do occur on the existence of prior
convictions typically will be short.'6 The prosecution will introduce
66 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
161 CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1025(c) (West 2003). The statute makes exceptions if the prior
conviction is alleged in order to determine the existence of special circumstances in a
murder conviction or if the prior conviction is alleged as an element of a charged prior
offense. Id. § 1025(d).
6 Id. § 1025(b) & (c); Epps, 18 P.3d at 2 (holding that amended statutes governing trial
of prior conviction allegations leave questions as to authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of
conviction records for jury determination).
"' CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS STATEMENT, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY BILL NO. SB 1146 (1997) (including statement of bill sponsor asserting problem of
cash-strapped state courts and statement of Public Safety Committee: "[Ilt appears that the
identity of the person suffering the prior conviction is the most common issue (and often
the only issue) in a jury trial on a prior conviction. Therefore, there is reason to believe that
this bill will significantly reduce the number of such jury trials.").
"' See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, StateNet, Senate Floor BILL No. SB 1146
(1997) (reporting argument of California Attorneys for Criminal Justice that: "Defendants
rarely choose to exercise [the right to jury trial on the existence of a prior conviction]; in the
vast majority of cases where priors are an issue, the defendant either stipulates to the
existence of the prior conviction or agrees to a court trial on the question. In those cases
where the defendant does exercise his right to a jury trial, it is often where there is some
serious question regarding the prior and where the consequences are great - for example,
under three-strikes, a potential life sentence may hang on the question of the prior
conviction.").
165 See, e.g., id. (reporting argument of California Attorneys for Criminal Justice against
amending statute providing for jury trial that "a trial on priors is generally quite brief, half
a day or less, so these trials are not a large burden on the courts.").
1004 [Vol. 37:973
2004] The Use of Prior Convictions After Apprendi 1005
documents establishing the existence of a prior conviction, such as the
judgment of conviction.'6 Courts have held that this evidence creates a
presumption that the defendant is the person that incurred the prior
conviction; the defendant must then put on some evidence in rebuttal.
In many cases, the defendant, whom the police will have linked to the
prior conviction because of fingerprints or other evidence,16 will not be
able to meet this burden, and it will take little time to move from
" See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997) (stating that government
can prove existence of prior conviction - an element of offense under 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(1)
- by introducing record of judgment or similar evidence identifying previous offense);
United States v. Chavaria-Angel, 323 F.3d 1172, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding that prior
conviction can be proved by uncertified court records but reiterating that "in this circuit,
district courts may not rely exclusively on the charging documents or the presentence
report as evidence of a prior conviction."); United States v. Matthews, 240 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.
2001) (explaining that sentencing court may not rely solely on classification of predicate
offenses in disputed presentence report); United States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 641 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (stating that "the district court did not err in accepting the presentence report as
meeting the government's burden to prove that [defendant] had two predicate convictions
under federal 'three-strikes' statute."); United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1019 n.6
(7th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[a] certified record of conviction or a presentence investigation
report, if not challenged, will normally satisfy" government's burden of proving prior
conviction); People v. Epps, 18 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2001) ("[Oifficial government records clearly
describing a prior conviction presumptively establish that the conviction in fact occurred,
assuming those records meet the threshold requirements of admissibility." (citing CAL.
EvID. CODE § 664 (West 2000) ("It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed."))).
The prosecution may also introduce fingerprint evidence or DNA-matching to link
the defendant to the person who incurred the prior conviction. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 485
N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (Ill. App. 1986) (noting that State had introduced certified copies of
defendant's prior convictions and corroborating fingerprints).
167 See, e.g., Gilliam, 167 F.3d at 640-41 (finding that evidentiary hearing not required to
prove two prior predicate convictions under federal three-strikes statute unless "defendant
tenders evidence to deny the seriousness of the former convictions or to deny that the prior
convictions pertained to him or her" (quoting United States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1424
(10th Cir.1998))); United States v. Phillips, 149 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
government met its burden of proving prior convictions by submitting "certified records of
conviction and other clearly reliable evidence" and that "burden then shifted to
[defendant] to challenge the government's evidence"); Epps, 18 P.3d at 7 (stating "that
official government records clearly describing a prior conviction presumptively establish
that the conviction in fact occurred.... Some evidence must rebut this presumption before
the authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of the prior conviction records can be called into
question."); cf. United States v. Flowers, 29 F.3d 530, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[If a defendant
believes that one of the prior convictions that the government seeks to use as a predicate
conviction under § 922(g)(1) [felon-in-possession statute] does not meet the legal
definitional requirements of 921(a)(2), it will be up to the defendant to challenge the
admissibility of such conviction. Any such challenge must be made with specificity.").
'6 See JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1635(a) (1974)
(stating that because of fingerprint information, "the police authorities are enabled to
inform the prosecuting officer that the now accused has already been convicted in some
other state for one or more other offense.").
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introduction of documents to decision. If, however, the defendant has
some evidence rebutting identity or the accuracy, authenticity, or
sufficiency of the documents introduced by the prosecution, the trial
appropriately will be longer.
On the issue of nullification, it may be that some defendants,
especially those facing a tough "three-strikes" sentence, may want to
have a jury trial on the existence of a prior conviction, in the hope that
the jury will seek to lessen the harsh effects of the law by finding that the
defendant did not incur a prior conviction. 16Carefully phrased jury
instructions informing the jury of its role may partially address this
concern.1 70 That juries might at times nullify, however, is consistent with
the role that juries historically have performed in softening the harsh
effects of the law.71
In sum, when the fact of a prior conviction would increase the
statutory maximum for a subsequent offense, there is little basis for
exempting that fact from rights to jury determination and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. To the contrary, the emphasis in Apprendi on the
additional loss of liberty and greater stigma presented by an increase
beyond the statutory maximum, and the Apprendi concern that a
defendant not be deprived of the jury trial and reasonable doubt
guarantees when additional punishment is threatened, indicate that
these constitutional guarantees should extend to proof of the existence of
a prior conviction. The Supreme Court's statements about the
constitutional necessity of the reasonable doubt standard to reduce the
margin of error with respect to deprivations of liberty, and the values
underlying the right to jury trial, also support this conclusion.
" See, e.g., Epps, 18 P.3d at 7 ("One might argue that defendants facing stiff three strike
sentences will be likely to raise these questions in every case, whether or not they have
merit, simply hoping for the possibility of jury nullification.").
70 Id. ("In a typical case, the prosecutor and the court can explain to the jury that,
though the evidence is uncontroverted, the law nevertheless entitles the defendant to a jury
verdict. The jury would then better understand its role. The court, however, should be
careful not to direct a verdict, which would be inconsistent with the defendant's right to a
jury trial.").
'.. See, e.g., Murphy, Integrating Constitutional Authority, supra note 24, at 782-84
(discussing how eighteenth-century English juries often found facts against weight of
evidence to mitigate harsh sanctions).
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III. THE PROCESS RESULTING IN A PRIOR CONVICTION OR DELINQUENCY
ADJUDICATION
Having argued that the jury trial and reasonable doubt guarantees
apply when a defendant contests the existence of a prior conviction, I
now address the distinct topic of whether these processes must have
been guaranteed in a prior tribunal for a judgment rendered by that
tribunal to qualify as an enhancement fact under the Constitution.
Specifically, if the tribunal that produced the prior judgment was not
constitutionally or statutorily required to afford a jury trial or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the question arises whether the judgment
may be used to raise the statutory maximum for a subsequent offense.
When Apprendi and Jones distinguished the use of a prior conviction
from the use of other facts to enhance a sentence beyond a statutory
maximum, they assumed a model in which the prior conviction is based
on the prosecution of an adult in an ordinary court of law for a serious
offense, one in which the defendant is entitled to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and a jury trial. 17 The model described by the Court in
Apprendi and Jones does not cover the circumstance of a prior conviction
that was produced under a standard less exacting than the reasonable
doubt standard. 173 Nor does the model contemplate an adjudication in
which no right to jury trial exists, such as a proceeding in a military
court, a juvenile court, an ordinary court of law in which the defendant is
charged with a petty offense, or a nonjury foreign tribunal.
Assuming that the defendant was afforded all applicable
174
constitutional and statutory rights in the prior proceeding, the issue
" See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000) (writing of "a prior judgment of
conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and
the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) ("[A] prior conviction, unlike any other factor used
to enhance a sentence, must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the
fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.").
,7 See sources cited supra note 172.
The Supreme Court has indicated that a prior conviction may not be used to enhance
a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the subsequent offense if the prior
conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. See, e.g., Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (excluding prior felony conviction for sentence enhancement
beyond statutory maximum because prior conviction was obtained without assistance of
counsel and without express waiver of right to counsel); cf. United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (remanding for reconsideration of defendant's sentence because
original "sentence [was] founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional
magnitude" - evidence of prior convictions obtained in violation of constitutional right to
counsel). Denial of the right to counsel is "a unique constitutional defect" and a defendant
at sentencing may collaterally attack a prior conviction on this basis if the prior conviction
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remains whether the prior conviction may be used later to enhance the
sentence for a subsequent offense. Although the process might have
been appropriate in the prior proceeding that resulted in the conviction,
it is a different question whether the process afforded in the prior
tribunal is adequate for another purpose - that of enhancing the
sentence for a subsequent offense. This part considers first the burden of
proof that must have applied in the prior proceeding and then turns to
whether a judgment produced by a nonjury tribunal may enhance a
sentence for a subsequent offense.
A. The Burden of Proof
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has indicated that because of
the stigma and potential loss of liberty that accompany a criminal
conviction, the reasonable doubt standard is necessary to maximize the
reliability of a decision to convict.1 75 A legislature that authorized an
increase in the statutory maximum for an offense based on the existence
of a prior conviction may have done so because of the desire to subject a
repeat offender to greater punishment than a first-time offender. The
repeat offender is deemed more culpable than the first-time offender. 176
In this circumstance, the reliability of the prior conviction is extremely
important. More severe punishment should be available only for those
defendants who actually committed the prior offense.
Accordingly, it would seem that due process requires that a prior
judgment may raise the statutory maximum for a subsequent offense
only if the prior judgment was obtained in a tribunal that employed the
is to be used for sentence enhancement. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 493-96 (1994).
The Supreme Court has indicated that beyond the right to counsel context, and absent
statutory authorization permitting collateral attack on the validity of a prior conviction that
will be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent federal offense, a defendant in a federal
sentencing proceeding may not collaterally attack the constitutionality or other validity of
previous state convictions that are used to enhance his sentence. Id. at 487-97; see also
Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 384 (2001) (holding that after enhanced federal
sentence has been imposed under Armed Career Criminal Act, defendant generally may
not use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 - providing postconviction remedy for federal prisoners - to
challenge collaterally prior state conviction on which enhanced sentence was based). If,
however, the defendant is still "in custody" for purpose of the state conviction, he may
attack his state sentence in state court or through federal habeas corpus review, and, if
successful, apply for reopening of his federal sentence. Custis, 511 U.S. at 497.
175 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
176 See e.g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912) ("The propriety of
inflicting severer punishment upon old offenders has long been recognized in this country
and in England.... [T]he repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies
heavier penalties when they are again convicted.").
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standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.177 Such a rule would not
change much of existing practice in courts in the United States with
respect to sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court has held that the
reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required in all criminal
proceedings in the ordinary courts of law, regardless whether the offense
is serious or petty.178 It has also held that the reasonable doubt standard
applies to adjudications of delinquency when a juvenile is charged with
violation of a criminal law.179 The Rules for Courts-Martial provide that
proof of guilt in military prosecutions must be beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 '
A rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the prior
proceeding would mean that a civil adjudication conducted under a
lesser standard of proof could not be used to enhance a sentence beyond
the statutory maximum for a subsequent criminal offense.'8s Moreover,
such a rule would make it necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for a
prior foreign conviction to have been rendered under a standard
equivalent to "beyond a reasonable doubt."'82
" Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 20, at 251-52 (advocating in part that "facts that increase
sentences [more than one year] must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the trial
judge at sentencing" regardless "whether the increase is due to a sentencing guideline or a
mandatory minimum or a sentencing factor.").
178 See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
" Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-68.
180 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. § 918(c) (2000) ("A finding of
guilty of any offense may be reached only when the factfinder is satisfied that guilt has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
181 Some courts have upheld the use of civil findings that resulted in a driver's license
forfeiture to enhance penalties in subsequent criminal proceedings for driving while
intoxicated. See, e.g., Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983)
(upholding use of civil license forfeiture in DWI case to enhance penalties for subsequent
DWI offenses), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); State v. Dumas, 587 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998) (upholding use of civil license forfeiture to enhance penalties for subsequent
DWI offenses).
182 Courts often examine all the procedures afforded in a foreign tribunal to determine
whether the proceeding was "fundamentally fair" and therefore worthy of recognition in a
criminal proceeding in the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164 (3d
Cir. 1998) (reviewing procedures afforded in court in Philippines that previously convicted
defendant and concluding that prior conviction could be used to trigger mandatory
minimum sentence under federal law); United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D.
Penn. 2002) (reviewing procedures afforded in court in Japan that previously convicted
defendant and concluding that prior conviction could be used to establish element of
offense under federal felon-in-possession statute - that defendant was convicted felon).
See generally Alex Glashausser, Note, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as
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A legislature might authorize a sentence enhancement beyond the
statutory maximum for a subsequent offense not because of the greater
culpability of a repeat offender but because a defendant who has been
previously convicted - whether the conviction was warranted or not -
should be "on guard" not to commit another offense. Consider 18 U.S.C.
App. § 1202(a)(1), which prohibits a convicted felon from "receiving,
possessing, or transporting in commerce or affecting commerce ... any
firearm" and makes violation of the statute punishable by a fine and up
to two years imprisonment.1 3 In a case involving this statute, Lewis v.
United States,18 the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe federal gun laws...
focus not on reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even
indictment, in order to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous
persons."185 Based on this interpretation of legislative intent, the Court
upheld the use of an uncounseled felony conviction to draw the
defendant within the ambit of the statute even though the prior
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because the defendant was
not afforded the right to counsel. 8 6
Lewis, however, did not involve a situation in which the legislature
had authorized the use of a prior conviction to raise the statutory
maximum for a subsequent offense. Indeed, the Court noted in Lewis
that enforcement under the statute of the "essentially civil disability [of
prohibiting convicted felons from possessing or dealing in firearms]
through a criminal sanction does not 'support guilt or enhance
punishment' on the basis of a conviction that is unreliable.""8 7
Thus, Lewis is not inconsistent with the argument here that a
conviction may not enhance the statutory maximum for a subsequent
offense if the conviction was rendered by a tribunal that employs a
standard of proof less than "beyond a reasonable doubt." When a
deprivation of liberty beyond the statutory maximum for a subsequent
Predicates for Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DuKE L.J. 134, 158-61 (1994)
(discussing courts' use of "fundamental fairness" test); Kimes, supra note 12, at 515-18
(same).
'" 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (a)(1) (2002).
" 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
" Id. at 67.
" Id. The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to
counsel for all felonies. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); see infra note 249
and accompanying text.
I" Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109,
115 (1967)). The Court contrasted the situation in Lewis to that in Burgett, which precluded
the use of a prior felony conviction to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum
for a subsequent offense because the prior conviction was obtained without the assistance
of counsel and without express waiver of the right to counsel. Id.
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offense could be triggered by the existence of a prior conviction -
regardless of the legislature's motivation for the sentence enhancement
- the reasonable doubt standard must have been guaranteed in the
prior tribunal.
B. Nonjury Proceedings
Let us now consider whether the absence of a right to jury trial in a
prior proceeding would invalidate using the conviction or adjudication
of juvenile delinquency obtained in those proceedings as a sentence
enhancement. The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial does not apply to either military courts1m or juvenile
courts. 9 Moreover, the Court has held that petty offenses - those
punishable by six months imprisonment or less - do not fall within the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment,9" even when the defendant is charged
with multiple petty offenses subjecting the defendant to possible
imprisonment of many years.191
Eleven years before Apprendi, the Supreme Court acknowledged an
issue as to whether a prior conviction rendered in a proceeding not
affording the right to jury trial may be used to enhance penalties for a
subsequent offense. 192 Because the petitioners in the case before the
Court were first-time DUI offenders, the Court stated that it would "not
consider whether a repeat offender facing enhanced penalties may state
a constitutional claim because of the absence of a jury trial in a prior DUI
prosecution."1
93
After Apprendi, prior adjudications by juvenile courts have been the
most common context for lower court exploration of whether the result
of a nonjury proceeding may be used to enhance a sentence for a
subsequent offense beyond the statutory maximum. 4  I thus will
consider juvenile courts first and then examine other nonjury tribunals.
" See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S.
122, 127 (1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1942).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-50 (1971).
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies
only to "serious offenses," not to "petty offenses." See infra note 238 and accompanying
text.
191 See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327-30 (1996) (holding no Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial for multiple petty offenses).
" Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 545 n.12 (1989).
193 Id.
'" See generally Feld, supra note 7, at 1195-1214 (discussing post-Apprendi cases on
whether juvenile adjudication may be used to enhance sentence for subsequent offense).
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1. Juvenile Courts
In a juvenile court, the state may charge the juvenile with violation of a
criminal law. In common parlance, however, the juvenile found to have
violated a criminal law is "adjudicated" rather than "found guilty" and
is termed a "delinquent" rather than a "criminal." 195 These terms are
rooted in the ideal that juvenile courts pursue the goals of therapeutic
intervention and rehabilitation rather than punishment.194
Relying largely on this ideal of rehabilitation rather than punishment
for juveniles, the Supreme Court in a 1971 decision, McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania,97 held that the federal Constitution does not guarantee a•198
jury trial in juvenile courts. The plurality opinion in McKeiver assumed
that a jury trial might interfere with the benevolent objectives of the
juvenile court system, by bringing increased adversariness, formality,
and delay to the proceedings. 99 It commented that jury trial would
possibly "put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of
an intimate, informal protective proceeding. "20  The plurality also
asserted that "[tihe imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court
system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function,
and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's
assumed ability to function in a unique manner."'20 1 Thus, the "unique"
functioning of the juvenile judge was perceived to override any possible
gains in the quality of factfinding that might be achieved by jury trial.
Moreover, the plurality assumed that imposing the right to jury trial
would impede experimentation in the states as to how best to achieve the
rehabilitation goals of the juvenile justice system.2 2
Abundant scholarly commentary on McKeiver has criticized its
203
reasoning and holding. With many statutes and sentencing guidelines
treating adjudications of delinquency as equivalent to criminal
convictions for purposes of sentencing enhancement,' °4 concerns have
191 See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 6, at 317.
" See id. at 317-18.
w 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"' Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion in McKeiver, joined by three other
justices. Id. at 545-57. In total, six justices agreed that the Constitution does not guarantee a
right to jury trial in juvenile courts. Id. at 545-57.




21 See Feld, supra note 7, at 1115 n.144 (citing numerous articles criticizing McKeiver).
" See sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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205heightened about the absence of a right to jury trial in juvenile courts.
Given the McKeiver Court's reasons for interpreting the Constitution as
not guaranteeing jury trials in juvenile courts, several commentators
have argued that a juvenile adjudication should not be eligible to
enhance the punishment for a subsequent adult offense.26 As Professor
Barry Feld, in a recently published article, states: "It seems contradictory
and fundamentally unfair to provide youths with fewer procedural
safeguards in the name of rehabilitation and then to use convictions and
sentences obtained for treatment purposes to punish them more severely
as adults."2 °7 Between McKeiver and Apprendi, however, courts routinely
upheld against constitutional challenge the use of juvenile adjudications
of delinquency to enhance sentences for subsequent adult offenses.2°
The question now is whether Apprendi should be read to invalidate this
use.
Post-Apprendi courts are divided over whether a nonjury adjudication
of delinquency may be used to increase the statutory maximum for a
subsequent offense .20 The two leading federal appellate cases both
2"5 See, e.g., David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1769, 1793-94 (1991); Feld, supra note 7, at 1190 (asserting that "[sitates' expanded uses
of juveniles' prior records to enhance the sentences of young adult offenders raise troubling
issues in light of the quality of procedural justice by which juvenile courts originally
obtained those convictions" and referencing fact that "the vast majority of states denyjuveniles access to a jury trial."); Sara E. Kropf, Note, Overturning McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania: The Unconstitutionality of Using Prior Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentences
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEO. L.J. 2149 (1990).
" See, e.g., Dormont, supra note 205, at 1791-94; Feld, supra note 7; Lise Forquer,
Comment, California's Three Strikes Law - Should a Juvenile Adjudication Be a Ball or a Strike?,
32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297, 1330-31 (1995); Kropf, supra note 205.
207 Feld, supra note 7, at 1193-94; see also id. at 1199 (noting "illogic of allowing
convictions obtained with fewer procedural safeguards in order to provide treatment
subsequently to be used to extend punishment"). Professor Feld advocates the overruling
of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, in which the Supreme Court held that the constitutional
entitlement to criminal jury trial does not extend to juvenile adjudications. Id. at 1135-61,
1184-1214.
208 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989); People v. Fowler, 84
Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988); see also Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile
Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1063 n.434 (1995).
209 Compare United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
use of defendant's prior nonjury juvenile adjudication to enhance sentence under Armed
Career Criminal Act violates Apprendi), and State v. Brown, 853 So.2d 8, 16 (La. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that "prior juvenile adjudications that resulted absent a jury trial are
constitutionally inadequate ... for purposes of subsequent sentence enhancement."), with
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003)
(holding that use of defendant's prior nonjury juvenile adjudication to enhance sentence
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210involve the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Under the
Act, a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm is
subject to a maximum sentence of ten years.211 If, however, the convicted
felon is found to have three previous convictions for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense, the ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of fifteen
212years. Congress has specified that juvenile delinquency adjudications
213involving violent felonies qualify as "convictions" under the ACCA.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tighe214 held that use of a
defendant's prior nonjury delinquency adjudication to enhance a
sentence under the ACCA violates Apprendi. The court quoted the
language in Apprendi that referred to prior convictions as having been
"entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury
trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt,"215 and it cited similar language in Jones.216 The Ninth
Circuit read this language as meaning that "the 'prior conviction'
exception to the Apprendi general rule must be limited to prior
convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings that
included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
21 7
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Smalley1 s found that a
nonjury delinquency adjudication may be used to enhance a sentence
under the ACCA.2 9 Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's reading of Apprendi
and Jones, the Eighth Circuit asserted that "it is incorrect to assume that it
under ACCA does not violate Apprendi), and People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 905 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (permitting nonjury juvenile adjudication of delinquency to be used to
trigger "three strikes law" for subsequent criminal offense), and People v. Bowden, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 513, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187; Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030.
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
212 Id. § 924(e)(1).
213 Id. § 924(e)(2)(C).
214 266 F.3d 1187.
215 Id. at 1194 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,496 (2000)).
216 Id. at 1193 ("Unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible
penalty for an offense... a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures
satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt and jury trial guarantees." (quoting Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (emphasis added by Ninth Circuit)).
217 Id. at 1194. But see id. at 1200 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe language in Jones
stands for the basic proposition that Congress has the constitutional power to treat prior
convictions as sentencing factors subject to a lesser standard of proof because the defendant
presumably received all the process that was due when he was convicted of the predicate
crime. For adults, this would indeed include the right to a jury trial. For juveniles, it does
not.").
218 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1114 (2003).
219 Id. at 1033.
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is not only sufficient but necessary" that an adjudication have afforded a
right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the
adjudication to qualify for the Apprendi "prior conviction" exemption.220
Instead, the Eighth Circuit asserted that the inquiry should be whether
"juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable" that they
can be used to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 2 1 In
discussing whether juvenile adjudications have the sufficient reliability
to form the basis of a sentence enhancement, the Eighth Circuit observed
that the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees
juvenile defendants the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit noted that due process
requires that the juvenile judge apply the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard in determining whether the juvenile violated a criminal law.2 3
The court concluded that "these safeguards are more than sufficient to
ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires." 2  Buttressing this
conclusion, the Eighth Circuit wrote, was the fact that several courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, have deemed juvenile adjudications reliable
enough to enhance a defendant's sentence within a prescribed statutory
range.220
Smalley petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.226 The
United States argued in its brief responding to the petition that the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari because of the circuit split over
whether prior nonjury adjudications of delinquency may, consistently
with Apprendi, be used to enhance a sentence above the statutory
maximum. 7 The United States also asserted that if the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Smalley, the Court should consider whether
Almendarez-Torres should be reaffirmed or overruled. 28  The Supreme
Court denied the petition for certiorari in Smalley229 and a petition in a
similar state case in which the Court had requested the views of the
220 Id. at 1032.
221 Id. at 1033.
22 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970)).
Id. (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 368).
224 Id. at 1033.
22n Id.
' Smalley v. United States, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003) (denying certiorari).
227 Brief for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030
(8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-6693).
22 Id. at 14.
' Smalley, 537 U.S. 1114.
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federal government.
2 30
The Ninth Circuit, in barring the use of a nonjury juvenile adjudication
of delinquency to enhance the statutory maximum for a subsequent
adult offense, has the better interpretation of Apprendi. In distinguishing
a previous conviction from other facts that might increase the statutory
maximum for an offense, the Supreme Court in both Jones and Apprendi
stressed that a defendant previously convicted would have been
afforded a panoply of procedural guarantees, including the reasonable
doubt standard and the right to jury trial, on the facts supporting the
prior conviction.231 Implicit in this emphasis is the Court's concern for
whether a fact that would enhance a statutory maximum has been
determined under procedures that maximize reliability.
As suggested earlier, McKeiver seemed to give a higher priority to the
juvenile court judge being able to function in a "unique" manner in
pursuit of rehabilitation goals than to reliability in factfinding. Although
determination by a juvenile court judge that the juvenile has engaged in
criminal conduct may be considered sufficiently reliable when the
theoretical aim is rehabilitation of the juvenile, it is an unwarranted leap
to conclude that a nonjury finding of criminal conduct is sufficiently
reliable to support the imposition of additional criminal punishment for
232
a subsequent adult offense.
Professor Feld argues that in addition to the absence of a right to jury
trial, juvenile court proceedings commonly have other attributes
suggesting that adjudications of delinquency do not meet the reliability
requirements of Apprendi. He notes the frequent absence of counsel for
juveniles during the proceedings 23 and that "the factual ambiguity of
2W State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002) ("The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief
in this case expressing the views of the United States."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 968 (2003).
The United States argued in its amicus brief in Hitt that the "petition for a writ of certiorari
should be held pending the disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari" in Smalley.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Hitt v. Kansas, 537 U.S. 968 (No. 01-10864).
The United States asserted that Hitt involved some uncertain state law issues and that
Smalley was a better case for the Supreme Court to review.
'"' See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
232 See Feld, supra note 7, at 1169 ("Apprendi exempted the 'fact of a prior conviction'
from its holding because of the Court's confidence in the quality of the criminal justice
system to produce reliable convictions. The right to a jury trial was the fundamental
constitutional predicate. The differences between the quality, validity, and reliability of
delinquency adjudications compared with criminal convictions call into question the
legitimacy of including them within Apprendi's exception.").
233 Feld, supra note 7, at 1170 ("The informality of delinquency proceedings enables
juvenile courts in many jurisdictions to adjudicate juveniles without the presence of
assistance of an attorney which further prejudices the accuracy and reliability of the fact-
finding process."); id. at 1194 ("[Tihe denial of a right to a jury trial and the questionable
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delinquency adjudications" can make it difficult for a later court to
determine the precise criminal conduct that was attributed to the
juvenile.23 Feld argues that the result of lesser procedural protections in
juvenile courts is that "a substantial number of delinquency
adjudications occur that would not result in criminal convictions or pleas
if defendants received all procedural safeguards."35
Given these procedural attributes of the juvenile court system and the
theoretical ideal that the juvenile system does not punish, but rather
attempts rehabilitation, delinquency adjudications should not be eligible
to raise the statutory maximum for a subsequent adult offense. To the
extent that juvenile proceedings may in reality have become punitive in
nature, one might question the legitimacy of a separate court system in
which juveniles are not afforded the same constitutional rights -
including the right to a jury trial - that an adult defendant would have
in an ordinary court of law. As long as a separate nonjury juvenile
system is maintained with the theoretical goal of rehabilitation rather
than punishment, however, a prior adjudication of delinquency should
not serve as a basis for enhancing beyond the statutory maximum a
sentence for a subsequent adult offense. Jones and Apprendi specifically
referenced prior "convictions" that were obtained in proceedings inS 236
which a right to jury trial was guaranteed; the circumstances attending
nonjury juvenile "adjudications" suggest that Jones and Apprendi should
not be interpreted to permit an increase in a statutory maximum based
on a prior delinquency finding.
2. Other Nonjury Tribunals
Let us now examine nonjury proceedings in which the purpose is
unambiguously that of criminal prosecution and punishment - as
opposed to the benevolent and therapeutic purposes that theoretically
attend a juvenile adjudication. Convictions in foreign courts may have
been produced without a jury trial akin to the U.S. model. On the
domestic side, a criminal conviction may be produced by a military
waivers of and delivery of effective legal services call into question the quality of
delinquency convictions."); id. at 1169-91 (discussing in detail issues surrounding counsel
for juveniles).
Id. at 1185-86 ("In addition, the factual ambiguity of delinquency adjudications
sometimes makes it difficult for criminal courts to determine for what offense the juvenile
court actually convicted a youth when it uses those convictions for sentence enhancements
or other collateral purposes.").
I d. at 1190.
See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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tribunal or an ordinary court of law in a "petty offense" case. The
Supreme Court has held that the constitutional right to jury trial does not
apply to military courts because juries were not available in military
courts when the Constitution was adopted, and because military
tribunals "in the natural course of events are usually called upon to
function under conditions precluding resort" to "a trial by a jury of the
vicinage where the crime was conmitted.", 37 Relying also on historical
practice, the Court has held that the constitutional right to jury trial
238applies only to serious offenses, not petty offenses. Moreover, the
Court has commented that "the possible consequences to defendants
from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to
outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial
administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive
nonjury adjudications."239
The question is whether a conviction produced in these various
nonjury proceedings may be used to raise the statutory maximum for a
subsequent offense. The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e would not
assert... that every criminal trial... held before a judge alone is unfair or
that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be
by a jury."240 As examples of fair determination of guilt by a nonjury
tribunal, the Court has cited adjudication by military courts 24 1 and the
242trial of petty criminal offenses by judges. Certainly, substantial loss of
liberty can be at stake in these nonjury proceedings. A defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses could be subject to possible
243imprisonment of many years; a military tribunal may impose
z See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1942).
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1904) (stating
that "there is no constitutional requirement of a jury" for petty offenses, and claiming that
constitutional language must be read in light of common law); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 555 (1888) ("[Tlhere is a class of petty or minor offenses ... not of the class or grade
triable at common law by a jury... [that] may, under the authority of Congress, be tried by
the court and without a jury.").
3 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
240 Id. at 158.
241 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-50 (1971) (stating that "we have been
content to pursue other ways for determining facts" and giving as example that jury trial
generally is not used in military trials).
22 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158 (stating that "we hold no constitutional doubts about ...
prosecuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial" after commenting that not
every criminal trial held before judge alone is unfair.).
243 For example, in Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996), the Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial to a defendant charged with
multiple "petty" offenses. Id. at 326-30. An offense presumptively is petty if the maximum
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punishment as severe as death.244 Nonetheless, the factfinding processes
in these nonjury tribunals are deemed sufficiently reliable to support
criminal punishment.
With these nonjury tribunals entitled under the Constitution to impose
punishment, there is cause to read more flexibly the language in Jones
and Apprendi that assumed a model of prior convictions rendered in a
proceeding in which a jury trial was guaranteed. Indeed, courts after
Apprendi have upheld sentence enhancements based on prior pettyS 245
offense and military convictions. If the prior nonjury proceeding has
complied with applicable statutory and constitutional requirements, and
the purpose of the proceeding was to punish criminal conduct, then a
conviction produced in such a proceeding should be considered
sufficiently reliable to qualify as an enhancement fact. Similarly, a jury
trial arguably need not have been available in a foreign tribunal for a
conviction produced by that tribunal to be used for sentence
enhancement. As a matter of due process, however, the sentencing
court should evaluate the foreign proceedings for fundamental fairness
to ensure that the factfinding process was sufficiently reliable to support
a finding of guilt.
247
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has upheld the binding nature of
prior judgments in subsequent litigation or prosecution, even when the
procedures afforded in the prior proceeding were less exacting than
those required in the subsequent case. Consider the case law
surrounding the right to counsel and the use of prior convictions to
enhance sentences. The Supreme Court has asserted that under the Sixth
Amendment, "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
term of imprisonment authorized for the offense does not exceed six months. Blanton v.
City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989). Thus, under Lewis, a criminal defendant
may be sentenced to many years in prison, without the benefit of a jury trial, as long as the
defendant is charged with offenses that are punishable individually by no more than six
months imprisonment.
24 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2004) (authorizing death as possible penalty for murder
committed by member of armed services).
245 See, e.g., People v. Cramer, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(concluding that Apprendi does not bar use of petty offense conviction rendered by nonjury
court to enhance punishment for subsequent offense); cf. People v. Natkie, 2002 Mich. App.
LEXIS 2327 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding against state and federal constitutional
challenge use of conviction pursuant to military court martial to enhance punishment for
subsequent civilian offense).
24 Cf. United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1998) (opining that prior conviction in
Philippines could be used to trigger mandatory minimum for U.S. crime even though court
in Philippines did not afford right to jury trial), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1079 (1999).
27 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony unless he was represented by counsel." 24  Moreover, the
Amendment guarantees a right to appointed counsel for all felonies,
regardless of the punishment actually imposed.249 By contrast, the Court
held in Scott v. Illinois25° that a defendant in a misdemeanor case does not
have a constitutional right to counsel when no sentence of imprisonment
is imposed. After Scott, the Supreme Court in Nichols v. United States251
approved the use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that was
valid under Scott to enhance the sentence under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for a subsequent offense, even though the subsequent offense
was a felony and triggered a right to counsel . In the civil context, the
Supreme Court has held that the determination of a factual issue in a
proceeding in which no constitutional right to jury trial existed may be
preclusive in a subsequent case in which the litigants ordinarily would
have the right to jury determination of that issue.2
These precedents support the notion that when a defendant has been
afforded all the constitutional and statutory protections that are due in a
particular type of proceeding, findings produced during the proceeding
may be binding in a subsequent case, even if more exacting procedures
are guaranteed in that later case. Drawing on these precedents, it would
seem that a criminal conviction produced by a nonjury court (be it a
military court, foreign tribunal, or ordinary court of law in a petty
offense case) should be eligible to enhance the statutory maximum for a
subsequent offense, even when the defendant would be entitled to a jury
trial on the subsequent offense.
24' Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
249 See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (stating that Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that Sixth Amendment as applied through Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment was applicable to States and, "accordingly, that there was an
absolute right to appointment of counsel in felony cases").
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
's, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
22 Id. Because Nichols involved a sentence enhancement within the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the prior conviction did not raise the possible punishment beyond the statutory
maximum for the underlying offense. Relying in part on McMillan, the Court in Nichols
reasoned that if a state need prove prior defendant conduct at sentencing only by a
preponderance of the evidence, "it must be constitutionally permissible to consider a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction based on the same conduct where that conduct must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 748.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-37 (1979) (factual findings in
equitable proceeding brought by SEC could be preclusive in shareholders' legal suit for
damages).
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In part II, I argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees jury
determination of the existence of a prior conviction in an ordinary court
of law when the prior conviction will enhance a statutory maximum.
This may seem inconsistent with my argument here that a prior
conviction may qualify as an enhancement fact even though the
conviction was produced by a nonjury tribunal. That conviction of some
crimes may be rendered by tribunals in which no constitutional
entitlement to jury trial exists, however, is a different issue than whether,
in a prosecution in which an entitlement to jury trial does exist, the jury's
constitutional authority should include determination of whether the
defendant incurred the prior conviction alleged by the prosecution.
In a military tribunal, the special objectives and needs of the
proceedings are perceived to override the benefits of jury trial. No such
special circumstances are present when the existence of a prior military
conviction is questioned in an ordinary court of law adjudicating a
subsequent offense. In "petty offense" cases, it is the "non-serious"
nature of the possible punishment - i.e., no greater than six months
imprisonment per petty offense - combined with the costs and
administrative inconvenience of jury trial, that have led the Supreme
Court to conclude that a jury trial is not provided by the Constitution.
But if the existence of a prior petty offense conviction would raise the
statutory maximum for a subsequent offense, and the defendant is
entitled under the Sixth Amendment to a jury trial for the subsequent
offense because it is punishable by greater than six months
imprisonment, then jury determination of the existence of the prior
conviction should be guaranteed.254 The absence of a right to criminal
jury trial in foreign legal systems likely will have many explanations,
including history and culture; a conviction in such a system may
nonetheless be produced through procedures that are geared towards
reliable factfinding. Once a defendant previously convicted in a foreign
tribunal is in a court in the United States in which an entitlement to jury
trial exists, however, the defendant should be entitled to jury
determination of the existence of the prior conviction if that conviction
If a subsequent offense is punishable by six months imprisonment or less, some
courts will recognize a constitutional right to jury trial when a prior conviction would raise
the statutory maximum for the subsequent offense beyond six months imprisonment. See,
e.g., People v. Reyes, 509 N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that recidivist sentencing
statute triggers constitutional right to jury trial because defendant who has recent prior
conviction may receive sentence of up to one year imprisonment for crime that otherwise
would be punishable by maximum sentence of six months); cf. State v. Mitchell, 2002 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2636 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 2002) (concluding that right to jury trial exists under
Connecticut statute when repeat offender was subject to jail time).
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would raise the statutory maximum for a subsequent offense.
Apprendi left open an important question as to whether a judgment
obtained in a tribunal that does not afford a right to jury trial or a right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be used later to enhance the
statutory maximum for a subsequent offense. I have argued that in
order for a judgment to raise the penalty for a subsequent offense, the
tribunal that produced the prior judgment must have applied the
reasonable doubt standard. Accordingly, neither a civil judgment
rendered under a lesser standard of proof, nor a criminal conviction
produced by a foreign tribunal that did not apply a standard equivalent
to "beyond a reasonable doubt" should be used to enhance a statutory
maximum for a later criminal offense. I have argued also that
convictions produced by a nonjury tribunal generally may be used to
enhance the penalty for a subsequent offense, but that adjudications of
juvenile delinquency, produced without affording the juvenile a right to
jury trial, may not be a basis for increasing the maximum penalty for a
later criminal offense.
CONCLUSION
Many courts have assumed that the Supreme Court answered in the
negative whether a defendant, charged with a prior conviction that
would increase the penalty for a subsequent offense beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum, has the right to a jury trial and to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt on the existence of the prior conviction. This
article has shown that these courts have misread the Supreme Court's
decisions, and it has argued that the reasonable doubt and jury trial
guarantees should apply when a defendant, facing an enhanced
sentence, contests the existence of a prior conviction.
Courts have given different answers to the separate question of what
process must have been afforded in the prior tribunal in order for the
prior judgment to be eligible to raise the statutory maximum for a
subsequent offense. I have suggested that the prior tribunal must have
employed a reasonable doubt standard, but, outside the unique context
of juvenile proceedings, the tribunal need not have afforded a right to
jury trial. To ignore prior convictions simply because a jury trial was not
available in the tribunal that rendered the conviction would undermine
legitimate reasons supporting increased punishment for repeat
offenders. On the other hand, we should have confidence that the
defendant indeed engaged in the conduct that led to the prior conviction
if that prior conviction is to raise the possible penalty for a subsequent
offense; the reasonable doubt standard minimizes the chance of an
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erroneous finding that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct.
One may disagree with the line drawn by the Supreme Court between
facts that would raise the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum and facts that would affect the penalty within the statutory
range for the offense. However, given that the line has been drawn on
the basis of the heightened potential loss of liberty and the heightened
stigma that attach to the enhancement of a statutory maximum, the line
should be an unwavering one. A dispute over the existence of a prior
conviction should trigger the same constitutional guarantees as a dispute
over any other fact that would increase the penalty for an offense beyond
the statutory maximum.

